Enthält:
LIVE OAK Study on Berlin Contingency Planning: More Elaborate Military Measures USEUCOM General Norstad, to Chief of Staff LIVE OAK, Major General Cooper, 26 June 1959 [1];
LIVE OAK Memorandum for General Norstad, 24 July 1959 [3];
British Memorandum on LIVE OAK Study, September-October 1959 [5];
LIVE OAK concerning Tripartite Agreement Berlin Contingency Planning, 4 April 1959, and Additional Military Preparatory Measures, 16 July 1959 [2];
Measures to restore Autobahn Access to Berlin: USEUCOM, General Norstad, to Commander in Chief BAOR concerning a British Plan of a Tripartite Military Operation, 22 March 1960 [4];
Memorandum of Chief Operations Section for General Palmer, 16 August 1960 [7];
Note of General Norstad, 19 September 1960 [8];
LIVE OAK: Correlation of LIVE OAK Studies relating to Maintaining Access to Berlin, Study "An Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions" dated 13 May 1959 and Study "More Elaborated Military Measures" dated 24 July 1959, 1 October 1960 [6];
Meeting between General Norstad, SACEUR, and Admiral Mountbatten, Chief of the UK Defence Staff, on 4 November 1960 [9];
SHAPE: Berlin Contingency Planning Directive, undated Draft [10];
Instructions to General Norstad, 18 September 1961 [11];
General Norstad on his relations to the Allied Commandants Berlin, 10 November 1961 [12];
Instructions to General Norstad in regard to Berlin, 29 August 1961 [13];
German Delegation: Working Paper on Blockade, 24 August 1961 [14];
German Statement on Exception to Directives to General Norstad on LIVE OAK, undated (BQD-3) [15]; Draft Instructions ot NATO Supreme Allied Commanders, undated (BQD-31) [16];
Draft Instructions to NATO Military Authorities, undated (BQD-32 Revised) [17];
Berlin Contingency Planning, Memorandum for Rear Admiral Eddison, 11 October 1961 [17A];
US, UK, French Tripartite Planning Group: Possible Non-Military Countermeasures to be Applied in Event of Obstructions of Allied Access to Berlin, 9 February 1961 (BERCON-TRI D-18) [19];
French Delegation: Draft of French Reply to the Soviet Note on the Tegel Incident (BQD-28) [20];
British Statement: Use of LIVE OAK as an Operation Staff, 12 July 1961 [21];
US Office of Secretary to USCINCEUR concerning Military Subgroup of Washington Ambassadorial Group on Berlin Contingency Planning and and concerning Civilian Aircraft Flights, 18, 23 August and 3 September 1961 [22, 23, 25];
SHAPE Messages concerning Council Disussion on Berlin and Four-Power Ambassadorial Working Group in Washington, 23 August and 22 September 1961 [24, 26]; Unites Nations: Memorandum of the Soviet Union on Measures to ease internatinal Tension, strengthen Confidence among States and contribute to General and Complete Disarmament, 26 September 1961 (BQD-34) [27];
NATO-Secretary General Stikker, concerning NATO Planning for Berlin Emergency, 27 September 1961 [28];
SHAPE Messages on NATO Planning for Berlin Emergency, 3 and 4 October 1961 [30, 31];
NATO Secretary General concerning Berlin Negotiations, 16 October 1961 [32];
Recommendations by the Governments of France, the UK, and the US concerning Relationships between NATO and the Three Powers in the Planning and Control of Berlin Contingency Operations, Revised Draft, 2 November 1961 [33];
Draft Instructions to the Military Authorities of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, undated [34];
SACEUR's Instruction to SHAPE Planners, (1961) [35];
Draft Presentation to the North Atlantic Council on LIVE OAK, undated [36]
